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FINE(ING) WINE: CHALLENGING DIRECT-SHIPMENT
LICENSING FEES ON DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
GROUNDS
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INTRODUCTION
“[W]ine,” Thomas Jefferson once remarked, “[is] a necessary of life
with me.”1 An avid wine consumer, Jefferson notoriously spent over
$16,500 on imported wines during his presidency alone.2 But imagine if, much to Jefferson’s chagrin, he could not have had his
favorite wines shipped directly to Monticello because the producer
had not paid the Commonwealth of Virginia for a direct-to-consumer
shipping license.3 Jefferson’s worst nightmare is a reality for
Americans in most states today, where costly licensing fees hinder
direct-to-consumer (DtC) shipping from out-of-state wine producers.4
Following the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, states were given
broad discretion to control the production, distribution, and sale of
alcoholic beverages.5 Contemporary regulations vary greatly stateby-state, but many states have adopted frameworks encouraging
domestic wine production by allowing wine producers to sell directly
to consumers.6 At the core of DtC regulations is the requirement
that producers obtain a direct-shipment license.7
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Granholm v.
Heald, which invalidated laws in New York and Michigan that
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Appleton (Jan. 14, 1816), in 9 THE PAPERS
349, 351 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2012).
2. See JOHN HAILMAN, THOMAS JEFFERSON ON WINE 256 (2006).
3. Jefferson, a Virginian, credited North Carolina planters with producing “the first
specimen of an exquisite [American] wine,” making it plausible that a hypothetical Virginia
licensing fee could inhibit North Carolina-based wine producers from shipping directly to
Jefferson. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (May 10, 1817), in 11 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 344, 345 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2014).
4. See James T. Lapsley, Julian M. Alston & Olena Sambucci, The US Wine Industry, in
THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF WINE INDUSTRY ECONOMICS 105, 125-26 (Adeline Alonso
Ugaglia et al. eds., 2019). For reasons unclear, some states distinguish between different
types of alcoholic beverages, for example, wine versus beer versus spirits. See, e.g., MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-4-101, -1101 (2019) (governing licenses for the sale of beer and wine,
respectively). The scope of this Note is limited to DtC regulations as applied to wine.
5. See Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 122; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
6. See Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 121-23.
7. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23661.3(a) (West 2019) (“[A]ny person currently
licensed ... as a winegrower who obtains a wine direct shipper permit pursuant to this section may sell and ship wine directly to a resident of California.”); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW
§ 79-d (LexisNexis 2011) (“Any person ... license[d] as a winery ... [may ship] directly to a New
York state resident.”); TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 16.09(a) (West 2009) (“The holder of a
winery permit may ship wine to the ultimate consumer.”).
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
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permitted in-state wineries to ship wine directly to consumers but
otherwise prohibited out-of-state wineries from doing the same,8
most states have extended direct shipment benefits to both in-state
and out-of-state wineries.9 While the Granholm Court implied that
states could police direct-shipment through “an evenhanded licensing requirement,”10 the reality is that producers are required to pay
exorbitant licensing fees on a state-by-state basis if they wish to
ship directly to consumers across the country. DtC licensing fees,
“while in [the] aggregate are reasonable expenses for in-state
wineries with significant volumes of direct sales, [are] prohibitively
expensive” for out-of-state wineries.11 Because DtC wine shipments
have become an increasingly important part of the wine industry,12
there are emerging concerns that state scrutiny of DtC wine shipping will be intensified.13
This Note advocates for a constitutional challenge to state DtC
licensing fees, arguing that the licensing fees impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. To this end, this Note will apply the
Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to state
DtC wine licensing fees. Under this framework, the Court has
almost always invalidated state laws that discriminate against outof-state interests absent a showing that the law is necessary to
achieve a legitimate purpose other than economic protectionism.14
If the state law is not found to discriminate against out-of-state
interests, the Court balances the law’s burdens on interstate
commerce against its benefits, invalidating a law when the burden

8. See 544 U.S. 460, 465-66 (2005).
9. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Gregory P. Luib, Moving Sideways: Post-Granholm
Developments in Wine Direct Shipping and Their Implications for Competition, 75 ANTITRUST
L.J. 505, 505-06 (2008) (discussing direct shipment laws post-Granholm).
10. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492.
11. Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 125.
12. See SOVOS, DIRECT TO CONSUMER WINE SHIPPING REPORT: 2018 YEAR IN REVIEW 4
(Andrew Adams ed., 2019), http://go.sovos.com/rs/334-HVN-249/images/2019-Direct-toConsumer-Wine-Shipping-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R5F-MA8F] (noting that DtC
accounted for over three billion dollars in revenue in 2018).
13. See id. at 32 (“As the DtC channel continues to grow ... [e]xpect more reporting
requirements focused on enforcing licensing and tax regulations.”).
14. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) (invalidating
a facially discriminatory state law prohibiting the importation of out-of-state municipal
waste); see also infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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imposed on interstate commerce is “excessive in relation to the
[law’s] putative local benefits.”15
There are two approaches to this balancing test. In balancing the
law’s burdens on interstate commerce against its benefits, some
circuit courts require a heightened standard in which the government must prove that the asserted local benefits are both genuine
and credibly advanced by the law;16 other circuits accept any rational assertion of benefit by the state.17 This Note argues that the
heightened approach to balancing is appropriate with respect to DtC
licensing fees because of concerns that states will prop up seemingly
legitimate interests that are not truly advanced by the licensing
fees.18 Moreover, a rational basis standard ignores the unique
climate conditions of particular states that affect the quality of wine
production.19 This Note will ultimately conclude that DtC licensing
fees are unconstitutionally burdensome on interstate commerce.
Part I overviews state DtC wine shipment licensing frameworks
and examines how the existing frameworks create a substantial
burden on wine producers. Part II discusses the Twenty-First
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the doctrinal framework
relevant to DtC licensing. Part III applies the Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause framework to DtC licensing fees using a heightened balancing standard for weighing the asserted benefits of the
licensing fees against the burdens on interstate commerce. Part IV
anticipates and addresses potential counterarguments about the
appropriate standard of review, as well as institutional concerns
about the judiciary weighing in on state policy decisions relating to
alcohol regulation.
15. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also infra notes 105-07 and
accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 298 F.3d 201,
216 (3d Cir. 2002) (opining that states “must provide evidence” that laws burdening interstate
commerce “have the benefits contemplated” by the legislature).
17. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 164 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e credit a
putative local benefit ‘so long as an examination of the evidence before or available to the
lawmaker indicates that the regulation is not wholly irrational in light of its purposes.’”
(quoting Ford v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 2001))).
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. By ignoring the significance of regional environmental idiosyncrasies in viticulture,
rationality review has the potential to embolden states to enact protectionist DtC licensing
fee structures. See infra Part IV.A.
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I. LICENSING TO CHILL: THE CHILLING EFFECT OF STATE
DIRECT-SHIPMENT LICENSING FEES ON DTC COMMERCE
Before addressing the constitutionality of DtC licensing fees, it is
necessary to overview state DtC wine shipment licensing frameworks. This Part briefly explains the structure of state regulatory
frameworks and discusses the purposes served by direct-shipment
licensing. It then discusses the pernicious effect that DtC licensing
fees have on wine producers and illustrates how the existing frameworks create a substantial burden on interstate commerce.
A. State Direct-Shipment Licensing Frameworks
Following the repeal of Prohibition by the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933, states were given broad discretion to regulate the
production, distribution, and sale of alcohol.20 Most states adopted,
and some states continue to enforce,21 a three-tiered distribution
system to control the alcohol industry.22 In effect, the tiered system
requires that licensed producers sell to licensed wholesalers, who in
turn are required to sell to licensed retailers, who alone are authorized to sell to consumers.23 A common component of this system is
the requirement that each entity within each tier obtain a license.24
The tiered system has long been justified as a means of “promoting
temperance,” collecting state tax revenue, and “ensuring orderly
market conditions.”25
With the emergence of more efficient means of distribution,
including ever-growing internet marketplace, states have become
increasingly receptive to schemes in which wine producers are
permitted to circumvent the traditional three-tiered system by
20. See Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 122; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
21. See Lloyd C. Anderson, Direct Shipment of Wine, the Commerce Clause and the
Twenty-First Amendment: A Call for Legislative Reform, 37 AKRON L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
22. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-735(D) (2001) (“A producer, winery, vintner, and
importer of wine are declared to be in business on one tier, a wholesaler on another tier, and
a retailer on another tier.”).
23. See Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 123.
24. See generally id. at 122-23.
25. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990); see Susan Lorde Martin,
Changing the Law: Update from the Wine War, 17 J.L. & POL. 63, 64 (2001).
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obtaining a license to ship wine directly to consumers.26 Direct
shipping refers to when producers ship “wine directly to consumers
outside the three-tier system, usually to their home or work via a
package delivery company.”27 Although the three-tiered system is
slowly becoming a relic of the past,28 certain aspects have carried
over to the newer DtC frameworks—most notably the licensing
requirement.29
Currently, forty-four states permit wine producers to ship directly to consumers.30 Forty-one states require that wine producers
obtain a license as a condition of shipping wine directly to consumers, and all but two of these states charge a fee for the shipping
licenses.31 In effect, this means that wine producers must pay for a
direct-shipment license in every state where it is required if the
producer wishes to distribute directly to consumers on a nationwide
basis. Moreover, because most states’ direct-shipment licenses
expire annually, producers must pay the licensing fee each year to
renew direct-shipment privileges in a given state.32 There is great
variance in the cost of DtC licensing state-by-state, but the annual
cost of DtC licensing fees exceeds one hundred dollars in twentythree states—a hefty financial burden for smaller producers.33
It is important to note that federal law mandates that wine producers obtain a federal permit from the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax
and Trade Bureau (TTB) as a condition of conducting business.34 A
26. See Anderson, supra note 21, at 3.
27. FED. TRADE COMM ’N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE
7 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/possible-anticompetitivebarriers-e-commerce-wine/winereport2_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V8Q-5Y8V] [hereinafter FTC
REPORT].
28. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 467 (2005) (discussing the waning vitality of the
three-tiered system).
29. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
30. See Off-Site Direct Shipping Summary, WINE INST. (2020), https://wineinstitute.
compliancerules.org/off-site-direct-shipping-summary/#off-site [https://perma.cc/R3C8-NQ2V].
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.; infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (noting that most wine producers are
small-scale operations). The annual cost of DtC licensing is particularly high in some states,
such as Connecticut ($315-$415), Illinois ($350-$1,500), Indiana ($100-$500), Louisiana
($400), Nebraska ($500), New Jersey ($938), New York ($375), South Carolina ($600),
Tennessee ($150-$450), Texas ($526), Vermont ($330), and Virginia ($230-$425). See Off-Site
Direct Shipping Summary, supra note 30.
34. See Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. § 203(b).
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winery cannot operate in any state without a federal license.35
Ironically, there is no fee at the federal level to apply for or maintain a license to operate a winery.36 The Federal Alcohol Administration Act, which mandates TTB licensing, is silent with respect to
state licensing provisions.37 As such, it is unclear whether the federal requirement that wine producers obtain a license preempts
state DtC licensing requirements.38 However, the question of whether federal licensing requirements preempt state DtC licensing
requirements is beyond the scope of this Note.
B. DtC Licensing Fees Are Prohibitively Expensive for Wine
Producers
While the cost of state DtC licensing fees may seem reasonable
when viewed on a single-state basis, the costs of DtC licensing are
striking when viewed in the aggregate.39 The United States is the
largest national wine market in the world, but from a marketing
perspective it “is better considered as 51 different entities consisting
of 50 states and the Federal District of Columbia.”40 DtC licensing
fees in a single state may seem like an ordinary business expense
for wine producers—and they might be for a winery with significant
volumes of direct sales in a particular state—but the reality is that
in the aggregate, the cost of DtC licensing fees is “prohibitively expensive for ... out-of-state winer[ies] that [are] shipping only a few
cases per month to a particular state.”41 As such, wineries end up
spending several thousand dollars annually just to access consumers across the country.42 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has

35. See id.; Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 492 (2005).
36. See Applying for a Permit and/or Registration, ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX & TRADE
BUREAU (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.ttb.gov/applications [https://perma.cc/B67A-YHZQ].
37. See 27 U.S.C. § 203(b).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.”). See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226-28 (2000)
(discussing implied preemption of state law).
39. See Off-Site Direct Shipping Summary, supra note 30.
40. Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 121.
41. See id. at 125.
42. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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stressed that “[e]ven seemingly small fees can deter smaller wineries from shipping wine to a particular state.”43
This burden is corroborated by producers throughout the country.
In Maryland, for example, which opened its borders to direct shipment in 2011, state officials reported that only eleven producers
applied for DtC licenses in the first month.44 To obtain a DtC license
in Maryland, wine producers must pay an annual fee of two hundred dollars plus an annual insurance payment of one hundred
dollars, which some commentators have observed is “prohibitive for
many of the country’s smaller wineries.”45 Similarly, two New Yorkbased wine producers explicitly cite costly licensing fees as the
reason why they ship only to a limited number of states.46 On their
webpages these wineries emphasize that, although direct shipping
is legal in most states, “[licensing] fees are prohibitively expensive
for ... small wineries” like themselves.47
It is misguided to characterize this as an issue that affects “only”
small wine producers.48 There are nearly ten thousand wineries in
the United States, and 96 percent are classified as “small,” “very
small,” or “limited production.”49 Given that DtC licensing fees may
“deter smaller wineries from shipping wine to a particular state,”50
it is doubtful that many wineries ship directly to consumers in every
state in which direct-shipment is available.51 To this end, it is
43. FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 41.
44. See Julie Bykowicz, Few Takers So Far for Direct Wine Shipping, BALT. SUN (June 26,
2011, 12:38 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-md-wine-shipping-20110620story.html [https://perma.cc/6FAA-KZ4F].
45. Id.
46. See Wine Shipping FAQs, HUNT COUNTRY VINEYARDS, https://www.huntwines.com/
Wine-Shipping-FAQs [https://perma.cc/U9D4-28WS]; Wine Shipping FAQs, KEUKA SPRING
VINEYARDS, https://www.keukaspringwinery.com/Wines/Wine-Shipping-FAQs [https://perma.
cc/73DB-H57N].
47. Wine Shipping FAQs, HUNT COUNTRY VINEYARDS, supra note 46.
48. See SOVOS, supra note 12, at 3. Winery size is determined by annual case production.
“Large” wineries produce more than 500,000 cases of wine annually, “medium” wineries
produce between 50,000-499,999 cases annually, “small” wineries produce between 5,00049,999 cases annually, “very small” wineries produce between 1,000-4,999 cases annually, and
“limited production” wineries produce less than 1,000 cases annually. Id.
49. See id.
50. FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 41.
51. See generally James Alexander Tanford, E-commerce in Wine, 3 J.L. ECON., & POL’Y
275, 303-04 (2007) (discussing how wine producers focus on developing local markets in the
absence of accessible national markets).
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unsurprising that smaller wineries accounted for less than twothirds of the total volume of DtC wine shipments in 2018.52
Even though “[t]he United States is an attractive market for wine
producers because it is large [and] lucrative,”53 DtC shipping still
represents a small percentage of wine sales in the United States—
just 10 percent.54 While there may be other contributing factors
discouraging wine producers from shipping directly to consumers,55
costly licensing fees bear significant responsibility.56 Direct shipment will remain a small part of the wine market so long as states
impose burdensome direct shipment licensing fees on producers.57
Consumers will have limited access to the wine market, and
producers will be hostages to the inefficient three-tiered system.58
This Note provides a roadmap for challenging these direct-shipment
licensing schemes under the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.
II. LEGAL VINTAGES: CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS
GOVERNING DTC LICENSING
To challenge the constitutionality of state DtC licensing fees, this
Note argues that DtC licensing fees violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. The dormant Commerce Clause stands for the principle that
state and local laws are unconstitutional if they place an undue
burden on interstate commerce.59 State alcohol regulations have an
additional layer of constitutional complexity because of the TwentyFirst Amendment, which grants states broad discretion to regulate
the production, distribution, and sale of alcohol.60 States find
constitutional authorization for DtC licensing in section 2 of the
52. See SOVOS, supra note 12, at 20.
53. Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 126.
54. See SOVOS, supra note 12, at 5.
55. See FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 41-42 (noting that “[t]he wine industry also faces
more subtle barriers to e-commerce, including ... very low quantity limits, advertising bans”).
56. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
57. See FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 31 (forecasting slow growth in DtC shipments).
58. See generally Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 126.
59. See James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Dormant
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3—Supreme Court Cases, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, § 2
(2009); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
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Twenty-First Amendment.61 This Part explores the history and
development of these constitutional frameworks.
A. The Twenty-First Amendment
Although many believe that the Twenty-First Amendment’s sole
purpose was to repeal Prohibition,62 its scope is much more expansive than just a mere negation of the Eighteenth Amendment.63
Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment grants states broad
regulatory authority over alcohol, specifically prohibiting the production, distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages within a state’s
borders if doing so would violate applicable state law.64 The TwentyFirst Amendment is largely viewed as being a return to the preProhibition regulatory state,65 making it necessary to examine the
regulatory framework prior to the ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment.
Before the Eighteenth Amendment, states had authority to
regulate the import of alcohol into their borders under the Wilson
Act.66 The Wilson Act, passed in 1890, permitted states to regulate
imported alcohol to the same extent that they regulated domestic
liquor.67 Notably, states could not prohibit the distribution of alcohol
under the Wilson Act.68 This loophole was closed by the WebbKenyon Act in 1913, which permitted states to ban alcohol importation and consumption altogether.69 This all changed with the
61. See id.; Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 122.
62. Marcia Yablon, The Prohibition Hangover: Why We Are Still Feeling the Effects of
Prohibition, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 552, 552 (2006); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1
(“The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby
repealed.”).
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”); Yablon, supra note 62, at 552.
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
65. See Yablon, supra note 62, at 554.
66. See id. at 581; see also Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C. § 121.
67. See 27 U.S.C. § 121 (“All ... intoxicating liquors ... transported into any State ... [shall]
be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State ... to the same extent and in the
same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State.”).
68. Yablon, supra note 62, at 581.
69. Id.; see Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (“The shipment or transportation ... [of]
intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one State ... into any other State ... to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used ... in violation of any law of such State ... is prohibited.”).
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Eighteenth Amendment in 1919, which banned alcohol nationwide
and ushered in the era of Prohibition.70
Prohibition was short-lived, however; the Twenty-First Amendment, ratified in 1933, repealed Prohibition just fourteen years after
it took effect.71 Prohibition is often remembered as a “failed experiment” and a “strange aberration” in American history, but temperance advocates hardly saw Prohibition’s repeal as a permanent
setback.72 Indeed, “[t]he aim of the Twenty-first Amendment was to
allow States to maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its transportation, importation, and
use.”73 Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment granted states
broad regulatory power “to ensure that [the] states had the legal
tools necessary to continue to fully effectuate their temperance
goals.”74 With these interests in mind, states began implementing
the three-tiered regulatory frameworks soon after the Twenty-First
Amendment’s ratification.75
The Supreme Court’s early Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence suggested that section 2 permitted the states to regulate
alcohol with exceptionally broad constitutional discretion—perhaps
to the extent that these powers superseded other constitutional
provisions.76 For example, in Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor
Control Commission, the Court rejected a challenge to a Michigan
law forbidding the importation of beer manufactured in states with
laws discriminating against beer made in Michigan.77 The plaintiff,
70. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (repealed 1933) (“[T]he manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation
thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage
purposes is hereby prohibited.”).
71. See id. amend. XXI, § 1.
72. Yablon, supra note 62, at 553.
73. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484 (2005).
74. Yablon, supra note 62, at 584.
75. See Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 122-23.
76. See, e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) (“The Twenty-first
Amendment sanctions the right of a State to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought
from without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause.”); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305
U.S. 395, 398 (1939) (“Since [the Twenty-First] amendment, the right of a State to prohibit
or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause.”);
State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936) (“A classification
recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth.”).
77. See 305 U.S. 391, 393 (1939).
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an Indiana-based beer manufacturer, was prohibited from selling
beer to Michigan wholesalers because Michigan identified Indiana
as a state “which by its laws discriminate[d] against Michigan
beer.”78 The manufacturer argued the Michigan law violated the
Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.79 In rejecting the manufacturer’s claims, the
Court reasoned that under the Twenty-First Amendment, “the right
of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating
liquor is not limited by the commerce clause ... [or] by the equal
protection clause.”80 The Court endorsed this sweeping interpretation of section 2 in a number of other early Twenty-First Amendment cases.81
The expansive view of the Twenty-First Amendment began to
fade by the 1960s.82 Around that time, the Court began to scale back
earlier suggestions that the Twenty-First Amendment permitted
state laws to violate other provisions of the Constitution, “confirm[ing] that the Twenty-first Amendment does not supersede other
provisions of the Constitution.”83 In the following decades, the Court
invalidated state alcohol regulations—notwithstanding TwentyFirst Amendment defenses—that were in violation of the First
Amendment,84 the Establishment Clause,85 the Equal Protection
Clause,86 the Due Process Clause,87 and the Import-Export Clause.88
78. Id. at 392.
79. Id. at 394.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1964)
(“To draw a conclusion ... that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to ‘repeal’
the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would,
however, be an absurd oversimplification.”).
83. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 486 (2005).
84. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) (“[A]n abridgment
of speech protected by the First Amendment ... is not shielded from constitutional scrutiny by
the Twenty-first Amendment.”).
85. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122 n.5 (1982) (“The State may not
exercise its power under the Twenty-first Amendment in a way which impinges upon the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”).
86. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-05 (1976) (“[T]he Twenty-first Amendment does
not save ... invidious gender-based discrimination from invalidation as a denial of equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
87. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (“We have no doubt as to
the power of a State to deal with the evils [of alcohol] ... [but the] requirements of procedural
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Of particular relevance to the issue of DtC licensing fees, the Court
also invalidated state alcohol regulations on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds.89
The Court’s pivot from its early Twenty-First Amendment
jurisprudence, especially with respect to cases involving both the
Twenty-First Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause,
reflects the idea that “[b]oth the Twenty-first Amendment and the
Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution. Like other
provisions of the Constitution, each must be considered in the light
of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake
in any concrete case.”90 In other words, the Twenty-First Amendment “must be viewed as one part of a unified constitutional
scheme.”91 The effect of this proposition is that state laws that
purport to be promulgated under the auspices of section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment must comply with other provisions of the
Constitution.92 As such, state DtC wine licensing fees are not
shielded simply because they find affirmative authorization in the
Twenty-First Amendment; the licensing frameworks must still
comply with dormant Commerce Clause principles.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the authority
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States.”93 In addition to this affirmative grant to Congress,
the Supreme Court has “construed the Commerce Clause to imply
due process must be met.”).
88. See Dep’t of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1964) (“To
sustain the tax which Kentucky has imposed in this case would require nothing short of
squarely holding that the Twenty-first Amendment has completely repealed the ExportImport Clause.... Nothing in the language of the Amendment nor in its history leads to such
an extraordinary conclusion.”).
89. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 493 (2005); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
90. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964).
91. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2462-63 (2019) (first
citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 109 (1980);
then citing Hostetter, 337 U.S. at 331-32; and then citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW 167-69, 180-82 (2012)).
92. See id.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

2120

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2107

a further command” known as the dormant Commerce Clause.94
When Congress has not exercised its plenary power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate a given area of commerce or, in other
words, has remained “dormant,” the Commerce Clause still prohibits states from enacting laws that place an undue burden on
interstate commerce.95
The dormant Commerce Clause has a long and complicated
history, but its roots trace back to the framing of the Constitution.96
The dormant Commerce Clause “reflect[s] a central concern of the
Framers that ... in order to succeed, the new Union would have to
avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had
plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States
under the Articles of Confederation.”97 The Commerce Clause’s implied nondiscrimination principle ensures that “[r]ivalries among
the States are ... kept to a minimum, and a proliferation of trade
zones is prevented.”98 Moreover, the dormant Commerce Clause
roots out economic protectionism, or state laws “that impose commercial barriers or discriminate against an article of commerce by
reason of its origin or destination out of State.”99 This ensures that
states are not “compelled to negotiate with each other regarding
favored or disfavored status for their own citizens.”100 Indeed, in the
landmark case Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall found
that these arguments in favor of the dormant Commerce Clause had
“great force.”101
The Supreme Court’s case law suggests a generally applicable
framework for determining whether a state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause.102 Under this analysis, courts must inquire
94. Buchwalter, supra note 59.
95. See id.
96. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2459-60.
97. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Hughes
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979)).
98. Id. at 472-73 (citing C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)).
99. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390.
100. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472.
101. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824). Chief Justice Marshall coined the term “dormant”
vis-à-vis the Commerce Clause, noting in dicta that the commerce power “can never be
exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie
dormant.” Id. at 189.
102. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2008) (summarizing the
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
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whether the challenged state law facially discriminates against outof-state interests. Discriminatory laws are presumptively invalid
absent a state showing that the law advances a legitimate local
interest that cannot be adequately served by a nondiscriminatory
alternative.103 In this context, discrimination refers to “differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”104 In the alternative, if the
state or local law treats in-state and out-of-state interests evenhandedly, then the law “will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
[law’s] putative local benefits.”105 This balancing test, which weighs
the state law’s burden on interstate commerce against the purported
benefits the law advances,106 is commonly referred to as Pike
balancing.107
Circuit courts take two different approaches to applying this
balancing test. Some circuit courts require a heightened standard
in which the government must prove that the asserted local benefits
are both genuine and credibly advanced by the law;108 other circuits
instead accept any rational assertion of benefit by the state.109 The
Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on this circuit split. Regardless
of the approach taken, Pike balancing does not necessarily prove
fatal for state laws; state laws incidentally burdening interstate
commerce are frequently upheld under Pike balancing.110
103. Id. at 338; see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)
(“[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule
of invalidity has been erected.”).
104. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
105. Davis, 553 U.S. at 338-39 (first alteration in original) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 353.
108. See, e.g., Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 298 F.3d 201,
216 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that states “must provide evidence” that laws burdening interstate
commerce “have the benefits contemplated by the” legislature).
109. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 164 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e credit a
putative local benefit ‘so long as an examination of the evidence before or available to the
lawmaker indicates that the regulation is not wholly irrational in light of its purposes.’”
(quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 2001))).
110. See, e.g., Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493, 526 (1989)
(upholding an environmental regulation adopted by the State Corporation Commission of
Kansas because it was “not ‘clearly excessive’” in relation to Kansas’s interest in preventing
production waste); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-74 (1981)
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Although the Court’s recent case law has extended the dormant
Commerce Clause framework to alcohol regulations,111 this was not
always the case. The Court previously employed an analogous
balancing test in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, which it created in
an attempt to alleviate the inherent tension between the dormant
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment.112 Under the
Bacchus framework, courts considered “whether the principles
underlying the Twenty-first Amendment [were] sufficiently implicated by the [law being challenged] to outweigh the Commerce
Clause principles that would otherwise be offended.”113 In other
words, the Court looked to “whether the interests implicated by a
state regulation [were] so closely related to the powers reserved by
the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail,
notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express
federal [interstate commerce] policies.”114 This balancing test is
commonly referred to as the “core concerns” test.115
In Bacchus, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Hawaii
liquor tax that provided exemptions for certain locally produced
alcoholic beverages.116 The Court ruled that the tax exemption
violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it had both the
purpose and effect of discriminating in favor of local products, and
because it was “not supported by any clear concern of the Twentyfirst Amendment.”117 The Court emphasized that this sort of “economic protectionism” is “not entitled to the same deference as laws
enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in
liquor.”118 Thus, in creating the “core concerns” test, the Court
concluded that economic protectionism is not considered a core
(upholding a Minnesota milk regulation because the “burden imposed on interstate commerce
by the statute [was] relatively minor”).
111. See infra notes 121-38 and accompanying text.
112. See 468 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1984).
113. Id. at 275.
114. Id. at 275-76 (quoting Cap. Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)).
115. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 404 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the
analysis used in Bacchus “is commonly referred to as the ‘core concerns’ test”).
116. See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265.
117. See id. at 276 (“[B]ecause the tax violates a central tenet of the Commerce Clause but
is not supported by any clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment, we reject the State's
belated claim based on the Amendment.”).
118. Id.
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concern of the Twenty-First Amendment.119 In subsequent cases, the
Court identified “temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions,
and raising revenue” as core concerns of the Twenty-First Amendment.120
Despite the existence of this “core concerns” test, the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Granholm v. Heald,121 the most notable
contemporary case involving wine regulations and the dormant
Commerce Clause, makes no mention of any “core concerns.”122 In
Granholm, the Court considered a challenge to state laws in
Michigan and New York that allowed in-state wineries to make
direct sales to consumers, but effectively prohibited out-of-state
wineries from doing the same.123 The Court explained that its
modern Twenty-First Amendment cases established three categorical principles: (1) “state laws that violate other provisions of the
Constitution are not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment”;124 (2)
“Congress’[s] Commerce Clause powers with regard to liquor” were
not “abrogate[d]” by Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment;125
and (3) “state regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause.”126 The Court then proceeded
into a dormant Commerce Clause analysis without any consideration of whether the state laws in question implicated the “core
concerns” of the Twenty-First Amendment.127
Under the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Granholm
Court concluded that Michigan and New York’s direct-shipment
laws were invalid.128 Because the challenged direct-shipment regulations “involve[d] straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor

119. See id.
120. See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990).
121. 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
122. Indeed, Justice Thomas’s dissent in Granholm sharply criticizes the majority’s
reasoning for overlooking the “core concerns” test, noting that even though “[t]he Court places
much weight upon the authority of Bacchus ... the Court does not even mention, let alone
apply, the ‘core concerns’ test that Bacchus established.” Id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(internal citation omitted).
123. See id. at 468-71.
124. Id. at 486.
125. Id. at 487.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 489.
128. See id. at 493.
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of local producers,”129 the Court looked to whether the laws
“advance[d] a legitimate local purpose that [could not] be adequately
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”130 The Court
swiftly discarded the states’ alleged interests in curbing underage
drinking and facilitating tax collection, noting that “the States
provide[d] little concrete evidence” to show that these interests were
advanced by the discriminatory direct-shipment bans.131 Because
the states failed to meet the “exacting standard” of showing that
“the discrimination [was] demonstrably justified,” the Court concluded that the direct-shipment regulations were unconstitutional.132
The Granholm Court appeared to abandon the “core concerns”
test in favor of the conventional dormant Commerce Clause framework.133 Although some early commentators were skeptical as to
whether the Court completely abandoned the “core concerns” test,134
the Court answered that question definitively in Tennessee Wine &
Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas in 2019.135
In Tennessee Wine, the Court relied heavily on Granholm’s
application of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis in striking
down a Tennessee regulation requiring alcohol retailers to satisfy
a two-year preconditional residency requirement before being issued
a retail license.136 Like in Granholm, the Court made no mention of
the “core concerns” test and instead applied the conventional dormant Commerce Clause analysis.137 Justice Alito’s opinion for the
129. Id. at 489.
130. Id. (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
131. Id. at 489-92.
132. Id. at 492-93 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S.
334, 344 (1992)).
133. See id. at 489.
134. See, e.g., Gregory E. Durkin, Note, What Does Granholm v. Heald Mean for the Future
of the Twenty-First Amendment, the Three-Tier System, and Efficient Alcohol Distribution?,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1106-10 (2006) (discussing whether Granholm implicated a
complete elimination of the “core concerns” test, or a partial elimination).
135. See 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2459 (2019) (noting that the Court granted certiorari “in light of
the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals about how to reconcile our modern Twentyfirst Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause precedents”).
136. See id. at 2470-71.
137. See id. It is possible that the Granholm Court and the Tennessee Wine Court strayed
from the “core concerns” test because the laws challenged in those cases were facially
discriminatory to out-of-state interests. See id. at 2458-59; Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
Nonetheless, this should not be construed to imply that the “core concerns” test will otherwise

2021]

FINE(ING) WINE

2125

majority, coupled with the other Justices’ questions during oral
argument, indicates that the appropriate test for determining the
constitutionality of state alcohol regulations is the dormant
Commerce Clause framework and not the “core concerns” test.138
The Court’s reasoning in Granholm and Tennessee Wine offers a
useful foundation for challenging DtC licensing fees. This Note
argues that the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
precludes prohibitively expensive state DtC licensing fees because
the licensing fees place a substantial burden on interstate commerce, notwithstanding the states’ Twenty-First Amendment
interests. Part III uses the Court’s reasoning in Granholm and
Tennessee Wine as a framework for challenging the constitutionality
of DtC licensing fees on dormant Commerce Clause grounds.
III. RED, RED FINE139: DTC LICENSING FEES VIOLATE THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
In Granholm, the Court suggested that states could further
interests in “facilitating orderly market conditions, protecting public
health and safety, and ensuring regulatory accountability ... through
the alternative of an evenhanded licensing requirement.”140
Evenhanded licensing requirements must nevertheless comply with
the demands of the dormant Commerce Clause.141 Facially neutral
state laws will be invalidated when “the burden imposed on
[interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.”142 Part III argues that DtC licensing fees fail this
balancing test, first arguing that DtC licensing fees require a
apply when state law affords evenhanded treatment, for this would run afoul with the “unified
constitutional scheme” principle. See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2462-63.
138. See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2470-71; Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Weigh
Text and History of 21st Amendment in Challenge to State Residency Requirement for Liquor
Licenses, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 16, 2019, 3:45 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/01/
argument-analysis-justices-weigh-text-and-history-of-21st-amendment-in-challenge-to-stateresidency-requirement-for-liquor-licenses/ [https://perma.cc/QXR4-PPE7].
139. See UB40, Red Red Wine, on LABOUR OF LOVE (Virgin Records Ltd. 1983).
140. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492.
141. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2008); supra text accompanying
notes 90-92.
142. Davis, 553 U.S. at 338-39 (alteration in original) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
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heightened balancing standard and then weighing commonly
advanced state interests in tax collection, facilitating orderly market
conditions, ensuring regulatory accountability, and protecting public
health and safety, against the burdens DtC licensing fees pose on
interstate commerce.
A. Wine DtC Licensing Requires a “Heightened” Balancing Test
As a threshold matter, it is important to observe that Pike
balancing applies only when considering the constitutionality of
evenhanded state laws.143 This Note will assume arguendo that
state DtC licensing fees are nondiscriminatory. In other words, this
Note will assume that state DtC licensing fees cost the same for all
applicants, regardless of whether the license applicant is an in-state
producer or an out-of-state producer. There is no indication that any
state has a facially discriminatory licensing fee structure.144
In applying Pike balancing, some circuit courts require a heightened standard in which the government must prove that the asserted local benefits are both genuine and credibly advanced by the
law;145 other circuits will instead accept any “rational” assertion of
benefit by the state.146 In light of the current circuit split in applying
Pike balancing, this Note argues that, at least with respect to DtC
licensing fees,147 courts should adopt the heightened approach,
which would require proof that the asserted local benefits of DtC

143. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
145. See, e.g., Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 298 F.3d 201,
216 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that states “must provide evidence” that laws burdening interstate
commerce “have the benefits contemplated by the” legislature); see also Town of Southold v.
Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 52 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In applying the Pike balancing test, the
District Court did not ... engage in any meaningful examination of the claimed local benefits
conferred by the [challenged law].”).
146. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 164 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e credit a
putative local benefit ‘so long as an examination of the evidence before or available to the
lawmaker indicates that the regulation is not wholly irrational in light of its purposes.’”
(quoting Ford v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 2001))); see also Pharm.
Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 316 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, J., concurring) (noting
that Pike balancing “is a test akin to the general rational basis test”).
147. The issue of whether “heightened” Pike balancing must extend to all dormant
Commerce Clause cases is beyond the scope of this Note.
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licensing be both genuine and credibly advanced by the fee component.
There are compelling reasons for using a heightened balancing
standard in the DtC context. First, alcohol is a sensitive regulatory
subject matter, making it easy for states to dredge up pretextual
interests that would justify stricter DtC regulations.148 Second,
heightened balancing acknowledges the unique link between wine
production and terroir, which refers to the effect of the total natural
environment of a particular viticultural site on the quality of the
wine produced.149 This Part evaluates these reasons in turn.
One need not look far for an example of a seemingly legitimate—albeit baseless—state interest in regulating alcohol distribution. In Granholm, Michigan and New York justified facially
discriminatory DtC regulations by asserting an alleged interest in
curbing underage drinking.150 This regulation would likely survive
rationality review, primarily because it is not wholly irrational to
think that placing limitations on DtC shipping would limit underage
drinking.
In Granholm, the Court exposed the flaws of rationality review by
simply evaluating the record, ultimately concluding that there was
“little evidence” to support the states’ claim that DtC shipping posed
an underage drinking problem.151 In fact, the Court cited an FTC
study that reported findings to the contrary.152 The Court further
noted that minors are more likely to consume other types of alcohol
than wine, that minors have more direct means of disobeying the
law than direct-shipment, and that minors are likely dissuaded by
direct shipment because they “want instant gratification.”153 In any
event, the burdens placed on interstate commerce by the discriminatory DtC shipping bans were excessive in relation to the states’
interest in preventing underage drinking.154

148. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (banning direct-shipment from
out-of-state wine producers to curb underage drinking).
149. See generally THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WINE 966-67 (Jancis Robinson ed., 1994)
(overviewing terroir).
150. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
151. See id. at 490.
152. See id. (citing FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 34).
153. Id. (quoting FTC REPORT, supra note 27, at 33 & n.137).
154. See id.
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The Court’s analysis in Granholm strongly weighs against
rationality review. Rationality review is incredibly deferential,
requiring only that the challenged law be “rationally related to
achievement of the statutory purposes.”155 Under rationality review,
courts would be more likely to uphold economic protectionist state
laws premised on pretextual interests, even in the absence of any
concrete evidence that these pretextual interests are advanced by
the law.156 This concern is particularly problematic in the context of
alcohol given the sensitive nature of the subject being regulated.
States have long had an interest in promoting temperance, and one
of the explicit purposes of the Twenty-First Amendment was to give
states a constitutional basis for enacting restrictions on the
distribution of alcohol.157 Rationality review would do little to prevent states from implementing protectionist economic policies
masked as laws related to public health and safety.
Heightened balancing further acknowledges the importance of
terroir in wine production. Terroir refers to the total natural
environment of a particular viticultural site, and the corresponding
effect that the environment has on the quality, taste profile, and
marketability of the wine produced.158 Terroir is the sum of a variety
of components including climate, sunlight energy, topography, soil
composition, and hydrology.159 Collectively, these factors “give each
site its own unique terroir,” which means that some states “may
have distinctive wine-style characteristics which cannot be precisely
duplicated elsewhere.”160
Because wine is intrinsically connected to the state in which it is
produced, there is an increased risk that states might implement
protectionist DtC licensing policies designed to favor in-state
producers. In states with fledgling wine industries, higher DtC
licensing fees are likely to favor in-state producers by reducing outof-state competition.161 DtC licensing fees, “while in [the] aggregate
155. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461-63 (1981).
156. See id. at 464.
157. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
158. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WINE, supra note 149, at 966.
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. See Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 125 (discussing the reasonableness of DtC licensing
costs for in-state producers versus out-of-state producers).
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are reasonable expenses for in-state wineries with significant
volumes of direct sales, [are] prohibitively expensive for” out-of-state
wineries with smaller volumes of direct sales.162 Rationality review
would likely uphold this strain of protectionism so long as the state
could rationally connect the licensing fees to an interest in tax
collection, facilitating orderly market conditions, ensuring regulatory accountability, or protecting public health and safety. In the
alternative, heightened balancing requires proof that the asserted
benefits of DtC licensing are both genuine and credibly advanced by
the fee component, which would expose impermissible economic
protectionism when it exists.
In the interest of protecting the integrity of the dormant Commerce Clause principle, states must be required to demonstrate that
the asserted local benefits of DtC licenses are both genuine and
credibly advanced by licensing fees. The dormant Commerce Clause
prevents states “from retreating into economic isolation or jeopardizing the welfare of the nation as a whole,” which would inevitably
transpire if “states were free to impose burdens on the flow of
[interstate] commerce.”163 Without a heightened balancing standard,
states may circumvent these principles at the expense of wine
producers and consumers alike, so long as they can build a logical
bridge between the asserted local benefits of the license and the
burdensome fee component.
B. Weighing State Interests
Having established that a heightened balancing standard is
necessary, this Note’s analysis shifts to weighing the asserted
benefits of DtC licensing fees against the incidental burdens on
interstate commerce. When legitimate local purposes exist, “the
question [then] becomes one of degree,” with the extent that a
commerce-burdening law is constitutional depending “on whether
[the state’s interests] could be promoted as well with a lesser impact
on interstate activities.”164 In other words, commerce-burdening

162. Id.
163. See generally Buchwalter, supra note 59, § 2.
164. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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laws are unconstitutional if less restrictive alternatives can advance
state’s interests.
In the context of alcohol regulations, the Court has recognized
state interests in “facilitating orderly market conditions,” collecting
taxes, “ensuring regulatory accountability,” and “protecting public
health and safety.”165 Under a “heightened” balancing standard in
which states would need to provide evidence that DtC licensing fees
actually advance these “putative local benefits,”166 states would be
hard-pressed to find proof that the licensing fee component furthers
the state interests. For example, states make no effort to demonstrate a link between DtC licensing fees and state interests in
protecting public health and safety. Several states have explicit
provisions directing DtC licensing fee revenue to the state’s general
fund, as opposed to earmarking the revenue for any specific public
health and safety initiative.167 Moreover, states can satisfy regulatory interests through less restrictive means such as federal licensing and the Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement Act.168 There is
no doubt about the legitimacy of these state interests; rather, the
concern is about the efficacy of DtC licensing fees as a means of
advancing these interests when existing, viable alternatives would
be less burdensome on interstate commerce and more effective at
furthering states’ interests.
Turning to state regulatory objectives, facilitating orderly market
conditions, collecting taxes, and ensuring regulatory accountability
can all be advanced through less restrictive means, such as the
federally mandated TTB license and the Twenty-First Amendment
Enforcement Act.169 The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
has the authority to revoke a winery’s federal TTB license if the
winery violates state law; a winery cannot operate in any state
without a federal license.170 Further, the Twenty-First Amendment
Enforcement Act gives state attorneys general considerable power
165. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 492 (2005); see also North Dakota v. United
States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990).
166. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
443 (1960)).
167. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
168. See 27 U.S.C. § 122a(b); supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
169. See § 122a(b); Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. § 203(b).
170. See § 203(b); see also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492.
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to sue wine producers in federal court to enjoin violations of state
law.171 The requirement that a producer pay for a state DtC
shipping license is unnecessary when viewed in conjunction with
these federal remedies. These remedies provide powerful incentives
for wineries to comply with state regulations, whereas DtC licensing
fees provide disincentives for wineries to conduct business in a state
in the first place.172
One can hardly argue that DtC licensing fees credibly advance
state interests in protecting public health and safety, either. DtC
licensing fees are an underinclusive method of protecting health and
safety given the ready availability of wine in other channels of
commerce.173 Moreover, the link between licensing fees and protecting public health and safety is tenuous at best, especially
considering that several states have explicit provisions in their state
law directing that licensing fee revenue be deposited into the states’
general fund.174 Licensing fees would more credibly advance state
interests in protecting public health and safety if the fee revenue
was earmarked for a specific initiative related to public health and
safety.175 In the absence of any such link, the burden on interstate
commerce is “clearly excessive” in relation to the alleged health and
safety benefits of DtC licensing fees.176
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that DtC licensing fees,
although applied evenhandedly to in-state and out-of-state wine
producers, must be held to a heightened balancing standard under
the dormant Commerce Clause framework. DtC licensing fees do not
survive heightened scrutiny; less restrictive alternatives can adequately advance state interests in facilitating orderly market
conditions, collecting taxes, ensuring regulatory accountability, and
protecting public health and safety. Because DtC licensing fees
171. See § 122a(b).
172. See supra Part I.B.
173. Cf. supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (noting that direct-shipment bans
would be ineffective to curb underage drinking).
174. See, e.g., N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 125 (LexisNexis 1934).
175. For an example of this earmarking principle, see generally Armikka R. Bryant, Taxing
Marijuana: Earmarking Tax Revenue from Legalized Marijuana, 33 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 659,
684-86 (2017) (proposing that state tax revenue from marijuana sales be earmarked for
developing social programs to assist those disproportionately and adversely impacted by the
War on Drugs).
176. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); supra Part I.B.
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impose an unnecessary burden on interstate commerce and do not
credibly advance any of the putative state interests, the licensing
fee component violates the dormant Commerce Clause and is therefore unconstitutional.
IV. SOUR GRAPES: ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS
Despite the evident dormant Commerce Clause concerns that DtC
licensing fees invite, opponents of the foregoing constitutional
arguments will likely raise issues with the appropriate standard of
review for Pike balancing and, in a similar vein, concerns about the
propriety of courts weighing in on alcohol policy. This Part addresses and rebuts these concerns.
A. Rationality Review
Some skeptics have suggested that heightened balancing puts
federal courts in the position of evaluating the merits of state legislation, thus transforming Pike balancing into a test bordering on
strict scrutiny.177 Proponents of this view instead advocate that Pike
balancing mandates rationality review.178 Under rationality review,
the relevant consideration is whether the commerce-burdening
regulation “is rationally related to [the] achievement of the statutory purposes.”179 This standard is deferential to the legislature,
suggesting that “it is up to legislatures, [and] not courts, to decide
on the wisdom and utility of legislation.”180 Evenhanded DtC
licensing fees would likely survive Pike balancing under a rational
basis standard because states would need only demonstrate that a
logical bridge exists between the fee component and the achievement of the relevant state interests. So long as there is a plausible
link between the two, courts would likely uphold the fee component.
Proponents of rationality review mischaracterize the nature and
purpose of Pike balancing. Pike balancing is “deferential but not

177. See James D. Fox, Note, State Benefits Under the Pike Balancing Test of the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Putative or Actual?, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 175, 179 (2003).
178. See id.
179. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 462-63 (1981).
180. Id. at 469 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963)).
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toothless,”181 meaning that state laws may be invalidated on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds when the alleged local benefits
are a pretext for discrimination or are otherwise trivial.182 “The Pike
test requires closer examination ... when a court assesses a statute's
burdens, especially when the burdens fall predominantly on out-ofstate interests.”183 That reasoning necessarily requires that DtC
licensing fees, which are prohibitively expensive for out-of-state
wineries,184 must be subject to a “heightened” standard.
Moreover, concerns about courts deciding the wisdom and utility
of state laws are equally misguided. The Court has recognized that
the “[e]xamination of [statutory] purpose is a staple of statutory
interpretation that makes up the daily fare of every appellate court
in the country,”185 and that “governmental purpose is a key element
of a good deal of constitutional doctrine.”186 Scrutinizing laws to
determine a discriminatory purpose is particularly relevant to a
dormant Commerce Clause claim.187 Pike balancing exists for this
precise purpose, and is the Court’s primary tool for rooting out
economic protectionism masked as a facially neutral state law.188
It is true that “[t]he Constitution does not prohibit legislatures
from enacting stupid laws,”189 but that does not save state laws from
meaningful judicial scrutiny. DtC licensing fees demand a heightened balancing standard because otherwise states could simply
dredge up any pretextual interest to justify stricter licensing
regulations, even in the absence of any proof that the alleged state
181. Colon Health Ctrs. of Am., LLC v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 545 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing
Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 339 (2008)).
182. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1981) (using Pike
to invalidate an Iowa highway regulation because the alleged safety benefits were “illusory”).
183. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir.
2005) (first citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987); then citing
Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 473 n.17; and then citing Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697
F.2d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1983)).
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005) (citing Gen. Dynamics
Land Sys. Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004)).
186. Id. (first citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); then citing Hunt v. Wash.
State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977); and then citing Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
187. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part III.
189. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 209 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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interests are genuine or credibly advanced by the law.190 Rationality
review further ignores the unique link between wine production and
terroir, and may in fact embolden states with fledgling wine
industries to impose protectionist licensing fees to protect in-state
wine producers.191 In sum, heightened balancing is better suited to
acknowledge these concerns than rationality review.
B. DtC Licensing Fees as a Matter of State Policy
In a similar vein, other critics have argued that DtC licensing
frameworks pose a collective action problem, more appropriately
addressed by the legislative branch—whether that be Congress or
state legislatures.192 In the context of interstate commerce, collective action problems refer to state policies that promote the selfinterests of one state at the expense of another.193 The actions of
individually rational states may produce irrational results for the
nation as a whole.194 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution acknowledges collective action concerns, and confers Congress with the
power to confront these problems.195
These concerns take on an extra layer of complexity in the context
of alcohol policy because of the Twenty-First Amendment, which
grants the states exceptionally broad power to regulate the production, distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages.196 Some have
viewed the Twenty-First Amendment as a return to the preProhibition regulatory state in which Congress granted states the
discretion to make these policy choices.197 In his dissenting opinion
in Granholm, Justice Thomas embraced this argument and argued
190. See supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
192. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A
General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010) (discussing collective action
issues under Article I, Section 8).
193. See id. at 117.
194. See id. at 160 (“When commerce from different states intermingles, large economic
advantages come from uniformity, access, and coordination in the channels and instrumentalities of commerce. Thus ... a flood control program upstream is more effective if it
coordinates with a flood control program downstream.”).
195. Id. at 121-23.
196. See Lapsley et al., supra note 4, at 122; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
197. See Yablon, supra note 62, at 554.
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that the Court focused too much on weighing alcohol distribution
policy issues, noting that “[t]he Twenty-first Amendment and the
Webb-Kenyon Act took those policy choices away from judges and
returned them to the States.”198 “Whatever the wisdom of that
choice,” Justice Thomas added, “the Court does this Nation no
service by ignoring the textual commands of the Constitution and
Acts of Congress.”199 Justice Gorsuch echoed similar concerns in his
dissenting opinion in Tennessee Wine.200
As persuasive as Justice Thomas’s and Justice Gorsuch’s countermajoritarian argument may be, it undermines the “unified constitutional scheme” principle.201 The Court’s jurisprudence indicates that
the Twenty-First Amendment should not be viewed in a vacuum.
Indeed, “[b]oth the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce
Clause are parts of the same Constitution,” and “must be considered
in the light of the other.”202 Put differently, the Twenty-First
Amendment does not discharge states of the obligation to comply
with the dormant Commerce Clause in matters of alcohol policy. It
follows that the Court must strike down DtC licensing fees using the
dormant Commerce Clause, which “by its own force and without
national legislation, puts it into the power of the Court to place
limits on state authority.”203
CONCLUSION
At its core, the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by a deeply
rooted suspicion that state and local governments may abuse their
power to effectuate economic protectionism.204 Although the
Framers envisioned a degree of state and local autonomy to make
198. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 527 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
199. Id.
200. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2484 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“As judges, we may be sorely tempted to ‘rationalize’ the law and
impose our own free-trade rules for all goods and services in interstate commerce. Certainly,
that temptation seems to have proven nearly irresistible for this Court when it comes to
alcohol.”).
201. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
202. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964).
203. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE
18 (1937).
204. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008).
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certain policy choices, the dormant Commerce Clause effectuates
the Framers’ desire to prevent states from retreating into economic
isolationism, which “had plagued relations among the Colonies and
later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”205 The
Constitution offers no clear solution to alleviate the tension created
by the Commerce Clause and the federalism principles behind the
Twenty-First Amendment, leaving the Supreme Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as the most viable path for challenging the constitutionality of DtC licensing fees.
Indeed, the Court’s reasoning in Granholm and Tennessee Wine
suggests that the conventional dormant Commerce Clause framework is the appropriate analytical framework for challenging DtC
licensing fees.206 Costly DtC licensing fees place substantial burdens
on interstate commerce by discouraging smaller wineries from shipping directly to consumers.207 Under a heightened balancing
standard, it is apparent that commonly advanced state interests in
facilitating orderly market conditions, collecting taxes, ensuring
regulatory accountability, and protecting public health and safety
are not credibly advanced by DtC licensing fees,208 and therefore the
fee component must be invalidated. States burden the free flow of
interstate commerce and discourage direct shipment by saddling
wine producers with costly licensing fees.209 Although the Court’s
recent decisions in Granholm and Tennessee Wine provoke serious
questions about the constitutionality of DtC licensing fees, the fact
is the fees remain unchallenged. The Court’s recent decisions are a
promising step in the right direction and mark a toast to the
beginning of the end of fining wine.
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205. Id. (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979)).
206. See supra notes 121-38 and accompanying text.
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